ClaroscuroEl sombrerero con diagnóstico
Engraving: a gentleman in a dressing gown, quill and writing board in hand, looks at a giant ledger on a roll whose sheets run down from the stand to the floor and keep unrolling across the room.

What a disorder costs, who keeps the books and why the figure given by the one who carries it can only go up

· 14 min read · Translated from the Spanish original. Read the Spanish original

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I. Seventeen words

Engraving: a gentleman in a dressing gown, seated in an armchair, raises his hand as if taking an oath, very serious, beside a little table with an enormous ball of cheese and a cheese wheel.
A figure, round as a cheese. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

The other day, in a group, I did a sum out loud. The whole sentence went like this: "this illness has cost me probably about 100,000 euros, more or less, more rather than less, I'd say". In Spanish that is seventeen words, and I have counted them because they call for an audit. Four hedges: "probably", "about", "more or less" and "I'd say". One figure, round as a cheese. And the only thing I stated without a safety net was the direction: more. A bloke who won't swear to the total swears, without batting an eyelid, which way he's wrong.

Then came the breakdown, and it came the wrong way round from how a sum is done in any office in the world: the total first and the items afterwards, with no amounts and in a list. "Loads of money on buying people drinks." "Loads of money on being ill, on not planning ahead, on money that goes and you don't know where." "Impulsiveness." There were more items, which are beside the point. And at the end one that was no longer money that went out but money that never came in: "loads of money on not having been able to finish things I could have finished and haven't been able to". And then, like someone remembering the VAT after signing, "the opportunity cost".

The drinks deserve a note in the margin, because it is the silliest item and the one that best shows the problem. In a company, buying people drinks is called client hospitality, and Spanish corporation tax law lets you deduct that expense up to one per cent of turnover. In a bipolar man, buying drinks without a brake is called a symptom: the manuals file it under the reckless spending of mania, it has no ceiling and it is NOT deductible. The same round of beers, paid for with the same enthusiasm, fits into two sets of books that are not on speaking terms. In one it is a business investment. In the other, proof that you weren't well.

And there lies the question my sentence doesn't answer: a hundred thousand euros of what. The drinks are money that went out. The unfinished things are money that never came in. And what I said another day somewhere else, that three psychoses had wrecked my life, isn't money by a long chalk. I added up three things that don't add up, like someone adding kilos, kilometres and heartache. So I went to see how the people who make a living from this do it, and there are three trades, and each keeps its own books.

II. The loss and the gain

Engraving: in a vaulted study, by candlelight, a hooded monk rules a line with a long ruler across the blank page of an enormous ledger; beside the book, a pair of scales.
The column was invented so the lender could get paid. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

The oldest trade has had it in writing since 1889. Article 1106 of the Spanish Civil Code says that "compensation for damages comprises not only the value of the loss suffered but also that of the gain the creditor has ceased to obtain". Two columns. What you lose, which lawyers call consequential loss, and what you stop earning, which they call loss of profit, with their good old Latin names: damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. My rounds of drinks go in the first. My unfinished things, in the second. So far, the Code and I agree.

The second column has a history I am in love with. It was put into circulation in the thirteenth century by a canon lawyer, Henry of Susa, known as Hostiensis, and he didn't devise it for the sick but for moneylenders. The Church forbade charging interest, because that was usury, and Hostiensis found the loophole: if I lend you my money and, by lending it to you, I stop earning with it, you owe me what I stopped earning. In other words, the column used today to measure what a misfortune has taken from you was invented so that the lender could get paid. Thomas Aquinas didn't swallow it, and his reason is the best objection anyone can raise against my list: the lender cannot sell what he does not yet have, and may be prevented in many ways from ever having.

And he's right, damn it. Who's to say I would have finished those things? Nobody. The Spanish Supreme Court pays loss of profit with the same distrust as Saint Thomas: it asks for the gain to be proved and leaves out, with a formula it repeats ruling after ruling, "doubtful or contingent gains". I read my list with that formula in front of me and the second column is left skin and bone. What I could have finished and didn't is, in courtroom language, a contingent gain, which means it might have happened and might not have. Exactly. It didn't. And what didn't happen can't be proved.

That leaves the third column, the one that isn't money. Spanish courts have paid it since 1912, when the Supreme Court held that the honour of a woman could be compensated, and they call it moral damage. And how do they count it? By "criteria of prudent discretion", which is the way rulings have of saying that the judge puts the figure in by eye, because there is no scale worth the name. So my "more or less" has case law behind it. The judge and I do the same thing with what has no price: we give it one, apologising under our breath.

III. Six hundred billion

Engraving: an economist in a frock coat and spectacles goes over a sheet of paper beside an enormous pair of scales, in whose pan a man sits among piles of coins; on the floor, another heap of coins with a banknote on top.
A person is worth what they would have earned. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

The second trade is the economists, and they don't apologise. In 2018 the OECD and the European Commission worked out what poor mental health costs the Union, which at the time was twenty-eight countries: more than six hundred billion euros a year, more than four per cent of everything produced. And they split it in three. A hundred and ninety billion in health care. A hundred and seventy billion in social benefits. And two hundred and forty billion in the labour market, which is what goes unproduced because ill people work less, work worse or don't work. The division is short: two hundred and forty over six hundred, forty per cent. The fattest column isn't what is spent on curing us. It's what we stop doing.

That seems to prove me right, and there's a catch, and the catch comes from the factory. The method was put together in 1966 by an economist at the United States Public Health Service, Dorothy Rice, and it is as sensible as it is ruthless: for these sums, a person is worth what they would have earned. Ten years later, going back over her own method with Barbara Cooper, she put it in writing without anaesthetic: pain and suffering are left out, because nobody has managed to quantify them. The third column, the one the judge puts in by eye, doesn't even have a line in the economists' books.

You can see where this is going. If a person is worth what they would have earned, a madman is worth what the madman would have earned. I, with twenty years in the kind of jobs that ask a lot, am an expensive madman: my second column is bulky. Someone whose first psychosis arrives at nineteen, before their first contract, has no second column to fatten, and for the accounts their illness comes out almost free. To put it bluntly: in the economists' books, madness is a problem for people with a payslip, and the poor madman comes cheap. It is what people have always thought, only now with a chart and decimal places.

IV. How many times and how high

Engraving: a doctor in a frock coat, bow tie and spectacles looks at a blank card in his hand, watched by an old man with a long beard, in a dressing gown and sandals, with one hand in his pocket.
The clinic doesn't ask you how much you earned. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

The third trade is the one that matters most to me and talks least about money: the clinic. The psychologist at a workshop was explaining it the other day, and explaining it well. There are two kinds of severity. That of the episode, which has a staircase: hypomania is less than mania, and mania is less than mania with psychosis. And that of the disorder, which isn't measured by a single episode but by how many there are and how much calm is left between one and the next, "a relationship between stability and the number of episodes". The clinic doesn't ask you how much you earned. It asks you how many times and how high.

Before contradicting it I want to write it in its best version, because it has one, and a very good one. Counting episodes is the only thing counted the same way everywhere: an episode weighs the same in a banker as in a waiter, in Madrid as in Lagos, with a payslip or without one. Of the three sets of books, it is the only one that doesn't look at the salary, and after seeing what the economists' method does to the poor madman, that counts for a lot. Besides, it is good for something. An episode can be given a start date, a dose and a discharge. "They've wrecked my life" cannot be discharged with any drug. A psychiatrist who measured severity by money lost would see the rich first, and for that we already have private health care, which needs no theory.

V. The bloody king of the world

Engraving: on the balcony of a house, a gentleman raises his glass in a toast beside three friends who are applauding, while to one side the front of the house cracks and comes down brick by brick.
Twenty years of work and three collapses. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

And even so I raised my hand and disagreed. I told him he was speaking in clinical terms, and that "we have to become aware of how disruptive one psychosis, or several, really is for a person's life compared with hypomania sustained over time". I gave the example I have nearest to hand, which is me: "I have been hyperfunctional, I've even done high-level competitive sport and I've held down extremely demanding jobs for 20 years, with hypomania sustained over time. I've basically been the bloody king of the world, surrounded by people, with friends, with a brutal social life". And then I said what I had come to say: "And yet, three psychoses have wrecked my life, completely".

Look at that account from both sides. The clinic looks at my twenty years and sees twenty years of symptom, because sustained hypomania is a symptom and it is in the books. It looks at my three psychoses and sees three episodes, three notches on a tally stick. My life looks at exactly the same thing and reads it the other way round: twenty years of work and three collapses. What on the clinic's staircase is the bottom step was, for me, the penthouse. And what for the clinic is three was, for me, EVERYTHING.

I finished with "I don't agree, I'm sorry, but I have to disagree", which is the politest way I know of raising your voice at someone. And the answer was: "but you're agreeing with me". I disagreed, apologised for disagreeing and was told I agreed, all in one go. I was left feeling I had lost an argument I had won, or won one I had lost, and I still don't know which.

The funny thing is that the figure that proved me right exists, and it comes from psychiatry itself. In 2000, Mauricio Tohen's team at McLean Hospital, the Harvard one, published the follow-up of 219 people over the two years after their first admission for a mood disorder with psychosis. After two years, 97.5 % had recovered from the syndrome: the symptoms had gone. But only 37.6 % had recovered functionally, which in that study means something as modest as getting back to the work and the home they had before. They do the sum themselves: of those who recovered from the syndrome, 63.1 % did not get their life back. Out of every hundred who come out of the episode, sixty-three don't get back to where they were. What I said in a workshop with my voice a little raised, psychiatry has had in print for a quarter of a century, in its journal of record.

VI. Interest

Engraving: a gentleman in an overcoat and hat walks down a snowy slope, and behind him, further up, an enormous snowball is waiting.
Compound interest without a contract. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

So far my version wins. But then came the second part of the answer, and it is the one that has made me write this. The psychologist put a case to me: imagine those psychoses had given you a one-off interference and you had been able to get your life back to normal; then we wouldn't be talking about the chronicity you describe. And I gave the only answer there was to give: "But the thing is, I couldn't get my life back to normal because of the consequences of the psychosis". And I drove it home: "the psychosis was so severe that it generated long-term consequences that have caused me problems which have deeply and radically worsened my prognosis".

Read the last word again. Prognosis. I, who had raised my hand to defend life against the clinic, ended up using the most clinical word in the dictionary, and using it correctly, what's more. The consequences didn't stay outside the illness, waiting in the corridor: they came in and made it worse. There, the psychologist and I were saying the same thing from two different columns. He was saying that chronicity is being left without stability. I was saying that what took my stability away was the consequences. Together, the two sentences say something neither says alone: that the disorder feeds on what it has cost you.

And that has been measured too. Sheri Johnson and Ivan Miller followed people with bipolar disorder through an episode, and found that those carrying a heavy blow, one of those severe negative life events that knock a life over, took about three times as long to recover. Losing your job, your home or your people comes after the psychosis, yes. And on top of that it makes the next one slower to leave.

Here Hostiensis comes back, the man who invented the second column so that interest could be charged. Psychosis didn't need anyone to invent it. What it takes from you in one episode it charges you again in the next, and what you stop earning leaves you in a worse place for the next time, and so on, like compound interest on a contract nobody has shown you. The moneylender figure holds up to here and here it breaks. You pay a moneylender and that's that: one day a paper arrives saying "settled" and you frame it. This account has no such paper. The interest can be brought down, and that is what treatment, people and whoever lends you a hand to get back to your place are for, but there is no counter where you can pay it off.

VII. More rather than less

Engraving: in front of a shop window, a top hat on a small wooden table, with a blank card beside it; on the right, on the pavement, a man in a cap and overcoat looks into the window.
In this Style 10/6. Engraving made for this essay, in the manner of Tenniel

And then I understand, with a delay that can't be invoiced, where the exact part of my sentence was. It was in the last words, and the hundred thousand euros, which came out by eye, were the least of it. "More rather than less", which I took for one more hedge, was the technical description of an account that is still open: things are still going into the first column, the second charges interest and the third can't be closed even by a judge, who puts it in by eye and with prudence. Of an account like that, from the inside, only one figure can be given honestly, and that is the floor. A hundred thousand euros is what it stood at the day I said it.

On the front page of this blog there is a drawing of a top hat with a card in its band: "In this Style 10/6", ten shillings and sixpence, exactly half a guinea. The card isn't Carroll's, who doesn't put a price on anything in the book. Tenniel drew it. The Hatter, when the King tells him to take off his hat at the trial, explains himself why he wears it with a ticket on: "I keep them to sell. I've none of my own. I'm a hatter." A hat can be made again, and that is why it has a price. What is your own has no price. It has an account.

Works cited

  • Spanish Civil Code (1889), article 1106.
  • Henry of Susa, Hostiensis, Lectura in Decretales (13th century); Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, question 78, article 2.
  • Law 27/2014, of 27 November, on Corporation Tax (Spain), article 15 e).
  • Spanish Supreme Court, First Chamber, ruling of 6 December 1912 (moral damage).
  • OECD and European Commission, Health at a Glance: Europe 2018, chapter 1.
  • Dorothy P. Rice, Estimating the Cost of Illness, U.S. Public Health Service, Health Economics Series, no. 6, 1966.
  • Barbara S. Cooper and Dorothy P. Rice, "The economic cost of illness revisited", Social Security Bulletin, 39 (2), 1976.
  • Mauricio Tohen et al., "Two-year syndromal and functional recovery in 219 cases of first-episode major affective disorder with psychotic features", American Journal of Psychiatry, 157 (2), 2000, pp. 220-228.
  • Sheri L. Johnson and Ivan Miller, "Negative life events and time to recovery from episodes of bipolar disorder", Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 1997, pp. 449-457.
  • Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, chapter XI, with the illustrations by John Tenniel (1865).
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