I. A Great Game of Chess

The pawn is the smallest piece in chess and the most abundant, eight a side, and it has one quirk it shares with no other: it cannot move backwards. It moves straight ahead, captures diagonally and, if it makes it alive to the back rank, turns into a new piece of its colour, almost always a queen. That is called promotion, just like getting a bump up in the office, and it is the only way a small piece ends up big. The rulebook explains it all very clearly. What it doesn't explain is what the pawn sees on its way forward.
From the top of a hill the field looks like a chessboard, with its straight boundaries and repeated plots. You see the rules, and you see a direction: that of the pawn advancing until it crowns. It's the deal offered by any philosophy of progress. From the square, the landscape is a different story. You see the hedge right in front of you, the stream you've got to jump over, and some massive pieces passing right beside you without looking where they tread. They are two views of the very same field, and neither of them is lying.
Machiavelli said it, former secretary of the Republic of Florence, in his dedication of The Prince to Lorenzo de' Medici, using a painter's image. Those who draw paesi—which in Italian means both countryside and landscape—place themselves down low, in the plain, to get a proper look at the mountains, and climb up the mountains to get a proper look at the plain. From there he derived his rule: to know the nature of the people one must be a prince, and to know that of princes one must be of the people.
I'm drawn to both vantage points, though I don't know them equally well. I like thinking big, with numbers and trends—that's what I studied history for. And I've been in some of the bad squares. That part I don't know from books. I know it from having been there, and from down there no trend comforts a soul.
Between the hill and the square there is no synthesis worth a damn, just a trade: going up and down without forgetting what you see from the other spot.
Both views are true at the same time, and they refuse to melt into one. But a trade that consists of going from one to the other needs something to cling to on the way down, because, as far as I know, no statistic has ever kept a human being afloat.
II. All the Running You Can Do

The philosopher on the hill is Hegel. For him everything advances, because each thing clashes with its opposite and sublates it. The verb is aufheben, one of those marvels of the German language that means simultaneously to abolish, to preserve and to elevate, as if in English "to take away" also meant "to keep". Universal history would be the progress in the consciousness of freedom. It's the sort of progress you can make sitting down: the optimism of a well-paid Berlin professor.
By the way, the famous scheme of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" is hardly his. It comes from Fichte, and the man who made it fashionable as a summary of Hegel was a populariser, Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, in 1837. Hegel barely used it, and he mocked those who reduced everything to a three-step waltz. He went down in history dancing a waltz he detested.
That dialectic that springs from two things to reach a third looks a lot like a game of chess. Two players, taking turns, moving one piece at a time, with thirty-two pieces all counted. The world has millions of pieces moving at once, and while the masters argue over the opening, someone is eating a bishop around the corner. Starting from two premises in a world of virtually infinite variables is an act of faith, no matter how much logic it gets dressed up in.
Julius Bahnsen, a disciple of Schopenhauer who managed to be even more pessimistic than his master—which takes some doing—went further. In Das Tragische als Weltgesetz, "The Tragic as World Law", published in 1877, he argued that contradictions are never resolved, that every synthesis manufactures its own, and that history is a battle without armistice—which is the truce signed by those who stop shooting without having made peace yet.
Six years earlier, in 1871, Lewis Carroll had put the exact same idea into the mouth of a chess piece. In Through the Looking-Glass, Alice climbs a hill, sees that the whole countryside is a chessboard cut up by streams and hedges, and wants to play, even if only as a pawn. The Red Queen makes her a pawn: she'll start on the second square and, when she reaches the eighth, she'll be a queen. Right away the two of them set off running hand in hand till they're ready to drop, and when they stop they're still under the exact same tree. "Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place," the Queen explains. The promise of the crown and the race that gets nowhere come out of the very same mouth.
In 1973 the biologist Leigh Van Valen turned that line into a law of evolution: the Red Queen hypothesis. Species that depend on one another—predator and prey, parasite and host—have to keep changing constantly just to hold the ground they already had. Biology had discovered the office.
Hegel reads history backwards from its end. That is called teleology, from telos, end, and his end looks suspiciously like an eighth square. Bahnsen strips away the end and leaves the battle, which, if you think about it, is just another way of knowing in advance how the book finishes. I don't think history has laws. It has trends, and a trend is just a tilt of the board, which can change with the very next move.
III. The Best of All Possible Worlds

Let's climb the hill; it's got good views. According to the World Bank, in 1990 some 36% of humanity lived in extreme poverty, about 1.9 billion people. The line is $1.90 a day, in 2011 figures, measured in purchasing power parity, which is the adjustment that corrects the dollar by what it actually buys in each country. By 2015 it was 10%, about 736 million. That's some 1.16 billion fewer people below the line, and before the pandemic it had already dropped below one in ten.
In 1820 roughly 12% of adults could read and write—one in eight—according to estimates by Our World in Data based on the OECD. Today it sits around 87%, almost nine out of ten. And the old figure errs on the side of generosity, because in many counts back then, just being able to sign your name was enough to pass as literate.
In China, over four decades, about eight hundred million people lifted themselves out of extreme poverty, according to a report published in 2022 by the World Bank and a research centre of the Chinese Government. The figure is an estimate, and it has its critics. Sullivan, Moatsos and Hickel argued in New Political Economy in 2024 that if a subsistence basket is used instead of the $1.90 line, Chinese extreme poverty would have peaked at 68% in 1995. The rebuttals I know of are on blogs, not in journals. Both sets of accounts are stalked by the same error, which carries a Latin name: post hoc, ergo propter hoc, after this, therefore because of this. That the curve drops after a set of reforms doesn't prove the reforms made it drop.
For all the caveats you like, there is less hunger and fewer children die. Behind every point on the graph there are people eating, reading, and not burying their kids. To sneer at that from a sofa in a rich country is a piece of considerable frivolity.
Now for the uncomfortable bit. Leibniz wrote a theodicy in 1710—which is the defence of God before the tribunal of evil—and concluded that we live in the best of all possible worlds. Forty-five years later, on 1 November 1755, Lisbon was wiped out by an earthquake, a tsunami and a fire, in that order. Voltaire replied with Candide in 1759, where the scholar Pangloss keeps repeating that all is well while the tip of his nose has been eaten away by syphilis, and he's missing an eye and an ear thanks to the treatment. It was textbook optimism, and the textbook was paid for by others.
That is the danger of the hill. The graph climbing up to the right can be read as an absolution—the word by which the court sets the accused free and the confessional forgives sins. Whoever looks at it absolves history entirely, and forgets to ask who paid for the bottom half of the curve.
IV. The Slaughterbench

You have to give Hegel credit: he saw the price, and he gave it a butcher's word. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History he calls history the Schlachtbank, the slaughterbench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States and the virtue of individuals are sacrificed. And he asks himself what all that sacrifice is for. He has an answer, and the answer has a name: the cunning of reason, which uses people for its own ends and wears them out along the way. A temp agency, but cosmic.
The question of "what for" feels very different from the square. Anyone who has worked on a building site or in the fields knows there are gangs of undocumented men who don't speak the language, who wouldn't know who to report it to if they cut a hand off, and who work from sunup to sundown for little more than food. There are trenches in Ukraine where nobody gives a shit that global violence, according to the graphs, is going down. A portion of life depends on merit, and another, massive portion on the square you happened to land in. If you're born in the mud, you come out caked in it.
In chess, sacrifice is calculated. A pawn is worth one point in every manual, the eight on each side are identical, and giving one up in the opening for position even has a name: a gambit, from the Italian gambetto, to trip someone up. The cunning of reason is a gambit played with entire peoples. And the math of the gambit only works because one pawn equals another pawn, and because when the game ends it goes back into the box. The person in the square isn't worth one point, isn't equal to any other, and doesn't go back into any box.
Dostoevsky put it in writing in The Brothers Karamazov in 1880, in a chapter titled "Rebellion". Ivan accepts God. What he does not accept is a world whose final harmony costs the tears of a single tortured child, and he hands back, with all due respect, his entry ticket.
I don't think Ivan is entirely right, but I know how heavy his words are. From the hill, people talk about the sum total of lives. From the square, the sum total doesn't exist. This life exists, and it doesn't add up with any other, nor is it compensated by the improvement of the rest. It will be said that the sacrifice of some serves those who come after, and in part that's true. But that doesn't answer Ivan. It proves him right on what hurts most: one person pays for the ticket and someone else watches the show. There are contradictions that aren't resolved. They're endured.
V. Machiavellian, Not Machiavellic

Thinking in numbers when talking about human beings gets a very bad press, and Machiavelli takes the blame for it—he did supply the adjective, after all. Yet he is the father of political science for that very reason. In chapter XV of The Prince he warns that many have imagined republics and principalities that no one ever saw, and that he prefers to go straight after the verità effettuale della cosa, the effectual truth of the matter. It's a very Florentine way of saying that before you spout an opinion you have to count.
It pays to separate two words that look very alike and get along terribly. Machiavellic, according to the dictionary, is someone who plays dirty. Machiavellian is someone who thinks like him. The difference fits into a suffix: counting people to understand what happens to them is Machiavellian; counting them to use them is the other thing.
He never wrote "the end justifies the means", no matter how many mugs it's printed on. The fact-checkers at Chequeado looked for the phrase across his work and found no trace. What he says in chapter XVIII is colder and far more interesting: when a prince wins and maintains his state, his means will always be judged honourable and praised by everyone. As advice it's not much use. As a portrait of how those of us down below judge whoever wins, it's a passport photo.
Between the historian studying a process with figures and the great helmsman moving millions of people by force there is a chasm, even if both count. Mao thought in numbers too. The propaganda of 1958 promised that the Great Leap Forward would put China on a par with Great Britain in fifteen years. What actually arrived was a famine that Frank Dikötter, in Mao's Great Famine (2010), puts at least at forty-five million dead, with harvests that existed in reports and not in granaries. The historian counts the dead. The helmsman produced them while counting something else.
And the painter's image can be read in reverse, too. The person who only looks from his own square doesn't see who is moving the pieces, and that is why he's so easy to move. Learning to look from above is the only defence a pawn has against being manipulated, and you can learn it without defecting to the prince's camp.
VI. A Compass Is Not a Map

There remains the big question: whether what is good can be measured. Spinoza gave it a serious go. His Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata—Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, written between 1661 and 1675 and published after his death in 1677—proceeds through definitions, axioms and propositions like a textbook by Euclid. To this day there are still those who claim science can tell us what is good.
Hume blocked their path nearly three hundred years ago, in Book III of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740). From what is, it does not follow what ought to be. That slash between is and ought is called Hume's guillotine, and nobody has slipped past it. Data describe. They don't command.
That is why I believe morality, at bottom, is dogmatic, and I say so without intending any insult. It rests on a few unproven principles that are accepted: that a child's life matters, that you don't torture, that the other person isn't a tool. Even Spinoza had to start with axioms, which are the things you put at the beginning because they can't be proved, and without which you can't prove anything at all. On top of that foundation you can reason all you like. The foundation itself isn't scientific.
Whoever tries to wrap morality in the authority of science ends up in a dogma that doesn't recognise itself as dogma, which is the worst kind of all. The totalitarianisms of the last century posed as scientific, and you should have seen the white coats they wore.
A compass points north and nothing else. It doesn't tell you which path to take or how far is left. But without a compass the hill and the square get confused, and you end up justifying any sacrifice with a graph, just like the helmsman did with his paper harvests.
VII. The Cell and the Tree

I have a compass, and I'll tell you which one. I believe there is a God, and that he is good. I haven't proved it—with Hume standing right in front of me that would be claiming a lot. I have needed him, and when I needed him he was there. It is faith, and I call it by its name, which is the honest way of not passing it off as geometry.
I wrote about it in Sabor a moneda vieja. During one of my hospital admissions, after the leather straps, came the virus protocol: nineteen days locked in a room, without hearing a voice or touching another soul. A quarantine squared, with the world locked inside its houses and me locked inside the lockup. I prayed. Not for them to open the door—the protocol opened that, not God—but for the whole thing to mean something. Suffering with a meaning can be endured; suffering without a meaning, no body can bear it. Viktor Frankl, who came out of Auschwitz alive, put it in Man's Search for Meaning in 1946, using Nietzsche's words: he who has a why to live can bear almost any how.
They say God is an invention. Maybe. Love is too, looked at from a certain height, and it isn't any less real to the person in love: from the hill, a lover is a demographic trend. Saying God is useless is like saying poetry is useless. It is, like everything that is worth something in itself and not for what it yields. Forced to choose between two faiths, believing in a good God seems prettier to me than believing everything is random and nothing means a thing. It takes a lot of strength, or a lot of self-deception, to live convinced of the second one. I don't have it, and I'm not ashamed of it.
My faith, moreover, doesn't just look upwards. I have as much faith in God as I do in the people keeping me afloat, and the difference between the two is a matter of hours. In the cell I talked to God because there was nobody else. Outside, I talk to him by a tree on the mountain, and then I go down and talk to the living.
VIII. Don't Take Away Their Anchor

Now I'm speaking as a patient and not as a believer, which are two different trades. For anyone dealing with a severe mental disorder, it is far easier to cling to a spiritual delusion than to accept a diagnosis. The delusion gives you a mission, and sometimes greatness. The diagnosis gives you a label, a pill and an appointment every three months. I fell into that temptation. When a psychiatrist offered to review my diagnosis, I grabbed hold of my delusion and stopped my medication on my own, like a pawn that thinks it's been crowned halfway across the board.
That's where I get my rule for anyone anchoring their life in a faith, whatever it may be: don't take it away from them. Where faith ends and the symptom begins isn't for me to decide—that's a matter for whoever is treating them. My job is not to be the bloke tearing the anchor away from someone who is drowning. I've seen people sink when they were stripped of the two or three things keeping them afloat. And there's no shortage of dinner-table smart-arses who treat someone else's faith as a calculation error, without stopping to look at what it's holding up. It's the vice of the hill in pocket size: looking at a belief from above and failing to see the weight it supports.
That doesn't mean leaving everything in God's hands. In every life there is a part that gets decided and a part you don't control—call it fate, chance or providence—and obsessing over controlling everything is just another way of getting sick. The Serenity Prayer asks for it with great economy: accept what cannot be changed, change what can, and know the difference between the two. I don't know a better definition of a pawn's freedom.
IX. The Eighth Square

Alice finally reaches the eighth square and finds a crown on her head. She's a queen. The other two queens fall asleep in her lap, snoring, which is what authority does when it has nothing left to command. The banquet in her honour goes to pieces. She pulls the tablecloth, grabs the Red Queen, shakes her, and the Red Queen turns out to be her kitten. She was dreaming.
The crown was at the end and it fixed nothing. That is my suspicion about all the eighth squares sold to us—the one of infinite progress and the one of paradise on earth, complete with a complaints desk. I don't deny that progress happens. The numbers from the hill say it does, and I believe them. What I'm saying is that the crowned pawn hasn't stopped having been a pawn, and the squares it crossed aren't wiped clean just because they put a crown on it at the end. The rules change the piece in that very move. Nobody changes the memory of the board.
So I'll stick with a trade rather than a synthesis. Climbing the hill to understand, without being ashamed of counting. Going down to the square so as not to forget that what I'm counting are human beings. Carrying a compass while knowing it's faith and not science. And clinging to what supports me—God and the people who love me—without taking away from anyone else what keeps them standing.
If I ever reach the eighth square, I want to get there with the tally done: how many pawns were left behind in the stream along the way.
Works cited
- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1871).
- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532), dedication and chapters XV and XVIII.
- G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837).
- Julius Bahnsen, Das Tragische als Weltgesetz, "The Tragic as World Law" (1877).
- Leigh Van Valen, "A New Evolutionary Law", Evolutionary Theory, 1 (1973).
- World Bank and Our World in Data, series on extreme poverty, literacy and hunger.
- World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council of China, report on four decades of poverty reduction in China (2022).
- Dylan Sullivan, Michail Moatsos and Jason Hickel, on reforms and extreme poverty in China, New Political Economy (2024).
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy (1710).
- Voltaire, Candide (1759).
- Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880).
- Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order (1677).
- David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740).
- Frank Dikötter, Mao's Great Famine (2010).
- Chequeado, fact-check on the phrase "the end justifies the means".
- Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (1946).
- Sabor a moneda vieja (2026).

